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***The Duplex World: Keizaburo Maruyama's
Elaboration on Saussure's Principle of the
Arbitrariness of Linguistic Signs***

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Abstract

This paper has two objectives. It intends, first, to elucidate Ferdinand de Saussure's discourse on the *arbitrariness of linguistic signs* and, second, to expound Keizaburo Maruyama's unique, epistemological thesis developed based on Saussure's ideas. The argumentation goes as follows. After illustrating that the Swiss linguist's case, having been understood too diversely, requires an accurate recapitulation and Maruyama's texts have received little heed, the first section which proves Saussure's original opinion entails that not only the relationship between a linguistic sign's signifier and signified but a language's classification system itself is absolutely contingent. The second section, scrutinizing Maruyama's theory about our interpreting the world, shows its gist is humans construe the universe through the *duplex articulation structure*. The third, concluding section describes his view on music as another attribute of his thought, and closes the discussion by indicating that his texts,

¹ Mikado, the first author, penned the introductory, first and second sections. Tateyama, the second author, wrote the third section except the last paragraph which Mikado composed

albeit written decades ago, can help us address today's conundrums.

Keywords: Ferdinand de Saussure, Keizaburo Maruyama, Linguistics, Structuralism, Semiology

Introduction: Overview and Contextual Background

No one would gainsay that Ferdinand de Saussure, who “revolutionized modern linguistics” (Kugler, 1992, p. 107), is worth studying again and again. Indeed, given the tremendous influences he has exerted on diverse fields, we ought to discuss him as one of the most momentous thinkers in modern times. If one wants to get a glimpse of how profound his impression on later generations has been, one has only to skim some books on contemporary intellectual movements. David Howarth (2007), a professor at the University of Essex who is conversant with post-war theoretical schools, maintained that “the work of structuralists and poststructuralists such as Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida and Ernesto Laclau is unthinkable without Saussure’s seminal contribution” (p. 139), and Holzman (1994) laconically but positively observed that “Saussure transformed twentieth-century thinking” (p.40). Besides these, a multitude of academics have talked on his achievements and effects (see Culler, 1977; Strozier, 1988; Stawarska, 2020; Lagopoulos & Boklund-Lagopoulou, 2021).

Although the Swiss linguist was brought up in the intellectual tradition of the West, his impact has never been limited to the region. Among the non-Western nations where his views have been taken in with a high degree of attention and have helped people to invent novel ideas, Russia is the most prominent. It is an established fact that the major

accomplishments of Roman Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetzkoy, whom Halle (1987) justly dubbed “the founders of modern phonology” (p. 95), are heavily indebted to Saussure (see Evtuhov & Stites, 2004, p. 529), and Valentin Voloshinov (1986), though denouncing him as “high point of abstract objectivism in our time” (p. 61), unquestionably resorted to Saussure’s thought in working up his theory emphasizing *actual* communication (see esp. pp. 83-98). Meanwhile, we should not pass over the Far East. While Chinese scholars have published a horde of interesting studies invoking Saussure to cast fresh light on the texts of ancient and medieval Chinese thinkers (e.g. Chung, 2009; Zhu & Wen, 2020), Japan has produced such figures as Hideo Kobayashi, who translated *Course in General Linguistics* first in the world, and Keizaburo Maruyama, who, having written several academic volumes on the Genevan, constructed his brand of philosophy.

For all his global reputation, however, the state of scholarship concerning Saussure is not exempt from grave problems, of which two are salient and should be tackled. First, there are *so many* commentaries on his theory. Given the difficulty of reading his texts and manuscripts without an aid, it might appear a welcome circumstance. But, lamentably, not a few of the explanations which both his followers and detractors have passed are misleading. In fact, even prestigious academicians had sometimes perverted it. For example, Lähteenmäki (2004) pointed out that Voloshinov misunderstood Saussure’s notion of the linguistic sign (see esp. p. 461), Macey (1988) made a detailed analysis of how Lacan mishandled the linguist’s thesis (see esp. pp. 131-138), and Joseph (1990) concisely proved that Chomsky had ignored him. Of course, it is not the case that there have been no scholars who have a proper understanding thereof. They, though, have tended to be too loyal to their master and rarely dared to

recapitulate his words in jargon-free language. Hence, the most revolutionary insight Saussure presented, “the arbitrary nature of the sign” (Saussure, 2011, p. 67), has not become part of our common knowledge, to say nothing of the overall picture of his theory; many people of today, albeit living about a century after his passing, still cherish such absurd fallacies as that language represents ideas or emotions conceived beforehand.

Second, Saussure is so magnificent a personage that the handful of inventive people who advanced unique discussions based on the precise construal of his theory have been unduly overlooked. Albeit not the main subject of this essay, De Mauro should be referred to as a representative. He has rightly enjoyed acclaim for his critical edition of Saussure’s *Course*, whereon Graffi (2006) commented as follows: “Today the exact knowledge of Saussure’s ideas cannot be gained without the support of De Mauro’s commentary” (p. 138). Nevertheless, it is not widely known that he, drawing on Saussure’s discourses, performed a vital service in fleshing out the concept of *plurilingualism*, though Nishijima (2018) carefully discussed the subject in her recent study. The abovementioned Japanese philosopher Keizaburo Maruyama is also one of such figures who tendered arguments that were, though inspired by Saussure’s thought, *sui generis* in their nature.

This is the contextual background in which this paper is written, and, in accordance therewith, we pursue two objectives. It intends, first, to elucidate Saussure’s *principle of the arbitrariness of linguistic signs* in as digestible parlance as possible, and, second, to expound Maruyama’s unique, epistemological thesis that he developed based primarily on the idea. To achieve them, the argumentation goes as follows. The next section proves that the principle not only means that the relationship between a linguistic sign’s signifier and signified is unnatural but also entails that a language’s classification system

itself is absolutely contingent. The second section, scrutinizing Maruyama's theory about our system of making sense of the outside reality, shows it fundamentally postulates that humans construe the universe through the *somatic* and *lingual demarcation*, that is, through *the duplex articulation structure*. The third, concluding section describes his view on music as another remarkable attribute of his thought and closes the discussion by indicating that his texts, albeit written decades ago, can help us address today's problems.

1. Saussure's First Principle: The Arbitrariness of Linguistic Signs

Considering that Saussure is sometimes cited in news and commentary sites dedicated to the general public (see Butterfield, 2015; Kaplan, 2016; Shamim, 2021), we would be allowed to suppose that he is not a complete stranger to the majority of today's people, and some of those who have majored in a discipline of the humanities or social sciences may bethink themselves that he is the man who averred that language is arbitrary, or, more accurately, that "the linguistic sign is arbitrary" (Saussure, 2011, p. 67). At the same time, we cannot help but wonder how many of them can spell out the real import of the proposition, which, denominated "Principle I" (Saussure, 2011, p. 67), is the centerpiece of his thought and constitutes its logical nucleus. This is because, as we intimated in the preceding section, in spite of a plethora of texts that purport to clarify his theory, their exegesis often either contains an oversight or is as recondite as their master's words.

Believing that the groundbreaking facts which the Genevan linguist unearthed through his scrutiny of the first principle should be a common heritage for humanity, this section endeavors to set forth a concise version which

delineates its meat in such a plain wording as standard undergraduates and citizens interested in intellectual pursuits could understand without a hitch. Certainly, as with any genuinely novel and ingenious argument, the actual words with which the linguist first unfolded it are considerably convoluted and would strike some as arcane or *recherché* (cf. Saussure, 2011, pp. 65-70, 111-121). However, we will evince that, when dissected with a systematic approach, it can turn out to be a sort of Columbus's egg, viz., a discovery that is revolutionary but easy to comprehend once one catches the point.

What are the nuts and bolts of the protestation that *the linguistic sign is arbitrary*? In order to aptly grasp the crux of what Saussure meant therewith, one must recognize that it is far deeper than it superficially appears, harboring a double meaning. To paraphrase, it ought to be deemed as being composed of two elements or messages, and, as will be inspected, each of them is distinct and thus should be analyzed one by one. Abstractly speaking, the theorem connotes, on one hand, that the connection between a sign's *signifier* and *signified*, i.e., between a word's sound image and imagery that is called forth thereby is non-grounded, and, on the other, that the way one classifies the world with one's language is alike non-natural.

Begin with an inquiry into the first dimension, whose kernel one would have little difficulty in fathoming, for it can be explained through a casual examination into any linguistic sign. Here we take up the English word *air* as an instance to be investigated. Upon perceiving the audio image of the word, anyone who is familiar with English would automatically conjure a collection of mental images associated therewith. Still, is the linkage between its sound representation and what is evoked thereby natural? Needless to say, it is not, and, it is of

moment that this applies to every linguistic sign. To express it in another manner, the bond between a word and what it summons up in one's mind is in no way governed by a logical rule. Saussure himself stated it in the following fashion: "The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. *The idea of 'sister' is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds...which serves as its signifier*" (Saussure, 2011, p. 67; italics added). Boiled down, the first message is that the way an acoustic impression and an idea are joined in a linguistic sign never reposes on any inevitable order.

Some may reasonably and rightly feel that this case is too banal, and, indeed, it was on no account what Saussure strove to substantiate, though it is regrettable that not a few people have wrongly assumed it to be the cardinal argument the linguist had intended to contend. If he had halted his quest at this stage, he would have left no footprint on the history of linguistics, because scores of his predecessors had communicated similar assertions by the time his *Course* was made public. Amongst them is Plato. His *Cratylus* makes a persona named Hermogenes allege that the name of a thing is determined and maintained merely by a convention (see Plato, 1998). At any rate, to drive the principle's whole drift to the reader, it would behoove us to discourse on the other dimension.

Minor issues aside, let us get straight to the very heart of the matter. We have just confirmed that the two components of a linguistic sign—an auditory image and the imagery invoked by it—are, in an elegant precis by Dressman (2008), "connected by historical use and by social convention" (p. 23), and, in the meantime, it is axiomatic that our languages are made up of numerous signs of such nature. At this juncture, we should deduce two consequences. The first is that each of our languages is constitutive of a totally disparate and idiosyncratic

assemblage of arbitrary signs, and the second is that, by dint of such an assemblage, any language categorizes the world, its existences, and phenomena as per its own methodology.

Essentially, this is the second message which Saussure encoded in the principle. Once a person has mastered a language to some degree, or once a language has struck its root in a person as the mother tongue, a given system of the language will define how the person speaks, thinks and feels thenceforth; yet, our languages, each of which is a peculiar totality of linguistic signs, divide up the world in their own individual manners; therefore, no matter in which language, or in which system of linguistic signs one thinks and speaks, the way the array of signs enables one to make an experience distinctly meaningful can be counted as arbitrary. To put it differently, it exposes the sobering reality that how one articulates, that is, differentiates reality into beings in such a way that one can say something of them must be adjudged to be purely unnatural. In a word, the classification system of a language is absolutely contingent.

In sum, what Saussure accomplished with the postulation was to lay bare the arbitrariness inherent in our languages as well as in linguistic signs. We presume that some may put it down as rather self-evident or even as a boring truism; that is the reason why we called it a sort of Columbus's egg. Nevertheless, despite its simplicity, it is true that the implications which Saussure compressed into the proposition have not become a piece of our common knowledge. The majority of people still naïvely presupposes that their language is a tool to describe reality that exists prior to cognition and that a word is a label for a thing which has been already distinguished ahead of verbalization. These assumptions are plainly erroneous. Although we should never be so arrogant as to claim that ours is the definitive explanation, we would be

permitted to suppose that it can contribute to diffusing the idea to a wider audience. In the next section, we will see how a Japanese thinker had evolved Saussure's insights including these into a unique theory of our interpreting the world.

2. Keizaburo Maruyama's Duplex Articulation Theory

The theorem which we have reviewed has given an intellectual stimulus to numberless thinkers in various parts of the world, of whom Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida are especially noticeable in terms of celebrity. It is crystal-clear that it offered a considerable inspiration to the latter in inventing the renowned concept of *proto-writing* (see Derrida, 1976). When compared to those personalities whose prestige has landed up at all quarters of the earth, Keizaburo Maruyama would seem a nameless figure. Few foreign scholars have alluded to the Japanese philosopher, and, in reality, it is growing rarer and rarer even for his fellow countrymen to comment on his texts. One can adduce several grounds for the gross obscurity in which he is submerged at present. While Maruyama himself is partly to blame for it because he wrote little in foreign languages, which is contrastive to his mentor Toshihiko Izutsu, the biggest reason must be his premature death, which came to pass when he was still sixty years of age.

Publicity, however, is not the infallible criterion with which to evaluate the quality and virtue of a philosopher's thought, though one ought not to rashly spurn it as an irrelevant or trivial factor. That can be partly but sufficiently proven by the fact that even eminent figures like Kierkegaard and Schelling, both of whom currently occupy a prominent position in the pantheon of philosophy, had sometimes been overlooked for a long while after their passing. As with the Dane and the German, Keizaburo Maruyama is definitely one

of those who have long been consigned to oblivion but whose work should be rediscovered. In fact, his oeuvre, numbering over a dozen books and treatises, is a fountain wherein a cornucopia of wit and wisdom is left untapped, though, naturally, a paper can debate only a few aspects thereof. Thus, as we preannounced, this section concentrates on illuminating his singular discourse upon the mechanism whereby human beings make sense of the world. If we succeed in satisfactorily elucidating his thesis that humans are, as opposed to other beings, exclusively accoutered with the *duplex articulation structure*, the readers will obtain a new perspective upon which to view both humanity and other inhabitants of this world.

At the outset, the historical context in which Maruyama had honed his thinking shall be sketched compactly. Famously, in the 1960s and 1970s, almost all scholars who were not so bigoted as to unfairly dismiss an unconventional idea had been squarely confronted with the various challenges posed by what Gustav Bergmann (1964) termed the “linguistic turn” (p. 3), which means “a turn to attention given to language as something that does not simply carry meaning, but makes meanings” (Lawler, 2013, p. 3). Needless to say, Saussure was, along with Wittgenstein and Peirce, treated as an icon by the proponents of the “movement whose general aim is to reverse the priority of thought over language” (Townshend, 2009, p. 195), though, as was stated, few fully comprehended his theory. In any case, what should be emphasized here is that language was the primary problem for the intelligentsia of that era and the notion that language plays a transcendental role in human cognition attained currency.

By the middle of the 1970s, the repercussions had spread to Japan, and, as the popularity of the idolized savants soared, thinkers in the locality would put forth a series of intriguing arguments in the ensuing decade or so. One of the pivotal

ramifications should be that the belief that linguistic ability is what decisively distinguishes the human species from other existences and humans do not directly access the world as it is but construct it through the primordial medium got prevalent, with a multitude of Japanese intellectuals of the time often defining humanity as *homo loquens* or as *homo symbolicum* (see Sugata, 1971 p. 106; Tanaka, 1984, p. 827; Yoshihara, 1984, p. 98). It is of note that Maruyama had sharpened and polished his thought within these circumstances.

That condition was conducive to refining the intellect of the Japanese philosopher who, having commenced his career as a teacher of the French language, would ascend to academic stardom with *Saussure's Thought* in 1981. If one reads the seminal volume and many of his succeeding publications, one would immediately notice that he, during a spell of anonymity, had mastered not only Saussure's ideas but also manifold theories of both eastern and western thinkers, and, in addition, had become well versed in the latest findings in scientific fields. In particular, his acquaintance with the *sciences of life* such as zoology, ethology, and evolutionary biology is astounding (see Maruyama, 1983, pp. 243-249). In all likelihood, it was this nonpareil erudition that capacitated him to detect that there were several points into which the foregoing research had not appropriately delved and to compose trailblazing texts.

His *duplex articulation theory*, having its chief theoretical foundations in the scientific theories and Saussure's thought, was a device to deal with one of the unexplored matters. In outline, the problem which he intended to probe relates to differences and parallels between humanity and other organisms. He described the task as "casting light on (dis)continuity betwixt the animal and the mankind" and, in more specific terms, as "an examination into the question of whether there is articulation prior to language or it is a

featureless, non-structured continuum” (Maruyama, 1987, p. 161). Although the quoted phrases may sound somewhat convoluted, the brass tacks are not complicated: in a nutshell, his intent was to clarify distinctive qualities of the way the human, who is undeniably an *animal* but one with *language*, *articulates*, that is, *demarcates* the world.

Preliminary to digging into the details of the theory in question, we ought to touch on its sources briefly. Once designated as his “longtime pet theory” (Maruyama, 1993, p. 116), he had actually expatiated on it again and again from the beginning of the 1980s until just before his untimely decease (see Maruyama, 1983; 1984; 1987; 1992). As one can effortlessly confirm in the cited works, it had suffered little change since its initial appearance; therefore, we assure that anyone who is adept at Japanese can get conversant therewith through any of the mentioned works, though this paper mainly quotes from his 1987 work titled *Life and Excess* because it seems that he had regarded as the last of his three magna opera (see Maruyama, 1987, p. 276).

Let us return to our muttons. The alpha and omega of the theory is condensed in the contention that “only the human animal lives in the *duplex articulation structure*” (Maruyama, 1987, p. 168). But this short quotation is just a tautology and says nothing at all. Figuratively, we must anatomize what modules make up the structure and how they are coordinated. Although we have implied a couple of times heretofore, the word *articulation*, first of all, must be understood in a broader sense than its ordinary one. One can reckon it as exchangeable for distinction, division, or *demarcation*, in that it denotes the action of differentiating something into discrete units. Next, as the adjective *duplex* strongly suggests, it consists of two (sub)systems, one of which is termed *somatic demarcation* and the other *lingual demarcation*. The two function

interdependently; still, we should be mindful that they are marked out as “heterogeneous” (Maruyama, 1987, p. 168), and, actually, each of them works according to different principles. Hence, it is incumbent on us to unpack them one by one.

The first system, *somatic demarcation*, would impress many as intelligible. It is depicted in various terms, such as “the categorization of the physical world that is peculiar to each species” and as “the sensory-motor articulation” that is “based on the instinctive scheme” (Maruyama, 1987, p. 169). Some may discern that it bears a resemblance to Jakob von Uexküll’s once renowned idea of *Umwelt*, and Maruyama (1993) admitted his intellectual debt to the scientist’s notion, declaring that “*somatic demarcation* almost corresponds to *Umwelt*” (Maruyama, 1987, p. 169). Allowing for the remark, we can safely reason that what Uexküll argued with the concept would fairly correspond to what Maruyama maintained with *somatic demarcation*. With a concrete instance, an American scholar brought forth a brilliant encapsulation of Uexküll’s discourse:

Uexküll...saw each life form as occupying its own, unique perceptual universe that is closed off to others. The bee...lives in an ultraviolet *Umwelt*, and the rudimentary environment of the common tick...correlates to nothing more than its sensitivities for the odor of butyric acid...and the temperature of 37 degrees Celsius.... (Foltz, 2011, p. 107).

Simply put, the theoretical biologist demonstrated that each one of the animals is bound to experience the world as an *Umwelt*, i.e. a construction that is always and already mediated through the totality of effectors and receptors unique to its species (see Uexküll, 1957).

We are sure that many readers may have intuited what Maruyama denominated *somatic demarcation* is like. Yet, we ought to add a few further comments on it. That is because the Japanese thinker illustrated *somatic demarcation* by invoking a

term of another body of knowledge, pronouncing it to be what produces “species-typical *gestalts*” and its function to be “turning the physical world into *gestalts* by means of natural apparatuses” (pp. 169-170). Of course, the body of knowledge is Gestalt psychology, and Maruyama (1987) made it clear that the word *gestalt* was borrowed thence (pp. 166-167), defining it as “an entirety, or a structure that cannot be divided into its elements” (p. 166). That definition, although a little untidy, is not far from that of a specialist, who stated, “A gestalt is a kind of whole...one in which the functional significance of each part is co-determined by all the other parts” (Rojcewicz , 1983, p. 267).

Welding these two types of exposition Maruyama had supplied into one and then weeding out technical jargons from it, we can spell out with confidence what the substance of *somatic demarcation* is. To cut the chase, *somatic demarcation* is an inborn system ingrained in all beings which enables every one of them to demarcate the external world into meaningful units but categorically prescribes, depending on what species it belongs to, how each of them does it.

Perhaps, some may look on the discussion hitherto conducted as commonplace or dull, fancying that it is too axiomatic that, to borrow the words of another distinguished biologist, “each animal lives in its own sensory and perceptual world” (Griel, 1984, p. 443). Still, does it apply to human beings too? True, it does to an extent, as an example that Maruyama (1987) furnished lucidly shows: “a newborn baby, without being taught anything, *somatically demarcates* the mother’s breasts and sucks them” (p. 170). Those who have a keen eye might come up with a different instance. Nonetheless, with only a transient reflection, many will realize that *somatic demarcation* does not work in us as it does in other life forms. Considering that even an essential deed for subsistence like

discriminating edible from inedible objects is not done according to the direction of our intrinsic apparatuses, one ought to logically calculate that humans have another, or an additional mechanism.

That is *lingual demarcation*, as Maruyama (1987) observed: "in my opinion, only human beings...have had another kind of *gestalts* as *excessive belongings*. This is...*lingual demarcation*" (p. 172). As is implicated by its denomination, this one is fundamentally grounded upon Saussure's Principle I, namely, the principle of the arbitrariness of linguistic signs; that being so, let us quickly remember its twofold keynote inspected in the previous section. We have checked that it contains two messages: the first is that the nexus between the signifier and the signified of a linguistic sign is contractual, and the second is that the way a language categorizes the world is also grounded on absolute contingency. What we should pay more heed to is, of course, the second because it is roughly the same as *lingual demarcation*. In short, our *language* sets many boundaries of our world, and this is *lingual demarcation* as the other module of the *duplex articulation structure*.

We had better get right straight to the very pivot. Contra other creatures for which realities are segmented on their body-based system, a large number of what human beings imagine as objective units are produced by "language in a wide sense as symbolizing proficiency and its activity", and "whereas language, by engendering culture, has capacitated us to extend our body...., our body has, in turn, been regulated as a result of being incorporated into it" (Maruyama, 1987, p. 172). In plainer words, he theorized that, whilst it is a positive fact that humanity as a species of life possesses an assemblage of built-in, bodily instruments for organizing things and phenomena and that it operates to a degree, their world is split up by multitudinous lines drawn by language, and this is what the

statement that only mankind is equipped with the *duplex articulation structure* means.

We believe that the topics to which we promised to attend in this section have now been covered. We do not boast that the above passages perfectly illustrate the warp and woof of Maruyama's *duplex articulation theory*; all the same, we can, at least, flatter ourselves that they are able to widen its accessibility to Anglophones. Yet, in winding up this section, we feel bound to mention another important issue, i.e., that of what lessons of wisdom we can glean from the theory. Though a comprehensive investigation has to be relegated to another paper, below we offer a few remarks on the matter.

In fact, Maruyama (1987) himself extensively mooted what implications his argument would have (see pp. 174-192). In our estimation, the most instructive of them would be the seemingly outre verdict that the *duplex articulation structure* "allows humans to render the non-existent present" (Maruyama, 1987, p. 174). This is neither a paradoxical jest nor a sophistic epigram that one may spot in a text written by a mediocre philosopher. Although here we cannot duly corroborate this with other direct quotations, it should be interpreted as pithily prompting us to perceive that how innumerable objects we naïvely construct as solid realities, notwithstanding that they are effects of the agency of our language and our somatic, inbred senses would never identify them as such. Some may suspect that we bring forward the same insistence as has been set up by social constructionists and fervent exponents of the linguistic turn; however, we should be awake to an acute difference between them and Maruyama. He did not go to an extreme, sensibly acknowledging that the corporeal hardware which each of us has would be basically identical. Possibly, what Maruyama urged us to appreciate might be more straightforward, namely, the duplex fact one's

worldview is theoretically incompatible with another's and/but that we, fleshly beings, anyway coexist.

3. Maruyama on Music

His thoughts extended far beyond linguistics and of modern philosophy. He is also known as a great karaoke-lover. His interests in singing are embodied in his opus titled *Why do people sing?* In this work, entitled as it was, he did not exclusively talk about the meaning of singing and music to people. We can easily catch a glimpse of his philosophical inclinations throughout the volume, of which the most prominent is one toward *gestalts*.

Weighing between absolute and relative pitches in music, Maruyama (2014) pointed out that relative pitch is the more fundamental of the two, maintaining, "while the ability of recognizing the absolute pitch can be an effective tool for those professionally involved with music, this ability is distinguished from one's musicality" (pp. 32-34). This means that the proficiency in comprehending the *relationship* of individual sounds enables us to enjoy music; to rephrase, what counts for much of one's musicality is one's capability to recognize the pattern which a combination of individual sounds creates. The *relationship* here must be noted. It ties in with a sort of relativism, which his texts often relate to *gestalt*. Hereby he came to conclude that the essence of music rests in the "relationship", continuing, "When we try to visualize in mind the face of someone intimate, we find it practically impossible to visualize with accuracy the outline of his/her eyes, nose and other details of the face. We are only recognizing *the pattern* each part of the face builds up" (Maruyama, 2014, p. 83). With this statement he seems to have amplified his thought that the

Gestalt, as he called it, should apply to most aspects of our power of recognition.

To some, Maruyama's conclusion might sound a little hasty; however, Shin'ichi Fukuoka (2009), a Japanese molecular biologist, can support Maruyama's perspective by raising another example concerning the appreciation of arts. His view is that well-painted pictures, though segments of one are valuable enough when looked at closely, should assume far greater impression from a distance commanding the entire view of the picture (see Fukuoka, 2009, pp. 153-154). At this point, artistic designs, whether sung, played or painted, are sublimated to the perfected entirety beyond the mere aggregation of individual parts. In addition, a biological experimentation by him revealed that a single animal stem cell secluded from others did not differentiate into having any function, hence revealing the fact that an individual cell comes to assume its own part of function only through relationships with others (see Fukuoka, 2009, pp. 97-98). If this experimentation means some essence of human *gestalt*, Maruyama's insights into our musical capability must be recognized as having reached one essential nature of human existence.

Having established his own view of *gestalt* in music, Maruyama's philosophical thoughts developed into the second of his key notion, namely, the *duplex articulation structure*. As can be inferred from the previous section, *somatic demarcation* is a preconscious structure which human race had acquired in the process of evolution. When we look at this structure in terms of music, we seem to have evolved to appreciate certain combinations of individual sounds as harmonious and cosmic, making others just noises or chaotic (see Maruyama & Hasumi, 1986, p. 22).

This is a primary cognition through human sensorimotor devices, and is purely coincidental and momentary. Actually, it may be to the experiences of many of us that the same melody evokes varying memories and emotions, depending on time, place, occasion and so forth.

When a certain melody comes to create increasingly greater meaning to someone, or more practically to some group of people, it is no wonder that they felt the irresistible craving to *rule and line* it in one way or another. Needless to say, this craving is not limited exclusively to music. Whether more significant or less than music, it is this craving that had helped people develop the power to segment the obscurity of nature, and signify, thereby articulate it.

This is where *lingual demarcation* comes in, and where people are placed under the destination of living with the *duplex articulation structure*.

Maruyama does not condone the turmoil resulting from this duplex articulation structure. For Maruyama, *lingual demarcation* represents our controlled, systematized and, therefore, static daily order, while *somatic demarcation* functions in the other way round, lively and dynamically. It is no wonder when we remember that the origin of articulating things lingually rested in finding meanings in the things people's lively senses found worth signifying. In other words, people began to use signs and languages alike to petrify or even inactivate the meaning of things for convenience's sake.

These two incompatible functions, somatic and lingual, that reside altogether within each individual can sometimes produce degrees of conflicts between the systematized surface of our daily life and the *underlying energy of life*, which he compared to "magma" under earth (see Maruyama, 2014, p. 175).

Maruyama believed our sclerotic daily order could sometimes work to oppress our subconscious dynamism of life, making people feel suppressed and suffocated. This tendency, he believed, is especially strong in Japan of his time, where hardworking is a virtue and workaholism prevails. It might sound a little hasty when he connected this view with the birth of karaoke in Kobe of Japan in 1972. Here karaoke and music alike are believed to reconcile these two incompatible human mechanisms.

And yet we might be able to find a certain degree of truth in his thesis on karaoke, singing and music functioning to this reconciliatory purpose when we consider the widespread popularity of karaoke in the world, the long tradition of music handed down seamlessly from generation to generation, and the fact, as Maruyama (2014) indicated, that music has also been used for therapeutic purposes in clinical medicine.

It is a voice of the late linguist urging us not to be confined to the world systematized by lingual demarcation alone, and to listen to and sometimes act according to the outcry of our *life* which is liable to be oblivious.

The reciprocating action between the sclerotic secular world and the dynamic and energetic world within an individual is the thesis strongly advocated by Maruyama (2014) as, in his vivid phrase, the “*circular movement of life*” (see p. 186).

Let us conclude our elongated argumentation by desultorily deliberating about a remaining topic that we vowed to treat at the inception. It is, in a phrase, Maruyama’s foresight. To render this in more concrete language, his texts, albeit written decades ago, can assist today’s philosophers in, if not settling, at least freshly approaching some of the ostensibly unsolvable problems which bitterly bedevil contemporary

society as well as their cerebral stamina, and we opine that Maruyama's thought would be especially effective in addressing the problem of *diversity*. It goes without saying this is not because we can locate a panacea in his discourses. In lieu, the principal rationale is that we can gain a secure terminus a quo from which to start working through the conundrum step by step and to which to return when an attempt miscarries. More specifically speaking, what we should detect in him is a stern injunction to face up to the truth that, in trying to communicate with another, one has to commence from the recognition that the diversity of people's ways to construe the world is so vast as to defy one's any attempt at mutual understanding. Although we must peruse his texts far more closely in order to forge this cursory speculation into a sophisticated and coherent discussion, we can say that, by reading Maruyama, we can procure a clue about how we, living in an epoch wherein diverse people with diverse values, perspectives, and ideologies ceaselessly fight against each other, can cohabit without denying the primal plurality connate with our world.

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